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THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE
PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION ACT OF 1947 AND
THE TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT
John Rogan*
The Presidential Succession Act of 19471 and the Constitution’s
Twenty-Fifth Amendment2 are at the core of the presidential succession
framework. Their relationship is complementary in some respects, but in
other ways the provisions are at tension.
The Twenty-Fifth Amendment, like the Constitution’s original succession
provision,3 identifies the vice president as the first successor to the
presidency.4 The successors after the vice president are set out by the
Presidential Succession Act of 1947. The successors in this statutory line are
the Speaker of the House and the Senate president pro tempore, followed by
the Cabinet secretaries in the order of the creation of their respective
departments.5
In addition to making the vice president first in line to the presidency, the
Twenty-Fifth Amendment addresses the vice president’s status when she
discharges the powers and duties of the presidency. When the president has
died, resigned, or been removed from office, the vice president becomes
president for the rest of the term.6 However, if the president is alive but
unable to serve, the vice president serves as acting president.7 The “acting
president” designation is a recognition that the president—who maintains his
title during an inability—can return to power.
If an official succeeded to the Oval Office under the Presidential
Succession Act, they would also serve as acting president, regardless of the
cause of their succession.8 But the acting president title does not place any
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of the program entitled The Presidential Succession Act at 75: Praise It or Bury It?, which
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1. 3 U.S.C. § 19.
2. U.S. CONST. amend. XXV.
3. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 6.
4. See U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 1.
5. See 3 U.S.C. § 19(a)–(b), (d).
6. See U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 1.
7. See id. § 3.
8. See 3 U.S.C. § 19(a)(1), (b), (d)(1).
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limitation on the powers the official would hold. An acting president would
have all of the powers and duties of the presidency.
Another important provision of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment is its
process for filling a vacancy in the vice presidency. When there is no vice
president, the Amendment’s Section 2 lets the president name a replacement
with approval from majorities of both houses of Congress.9
By creating a way to fill vice presidential vacancies, the Twenty-Fifth
Amendment made it much less likely that the line of succession in the
Presidential Succession Act would be needed. Before the Twenty-Fifth
Amendment’s ratification in 1967, there was no vice president for a total of
thirty-seven years and three months.10 The statutory line of succession was
never reached in those nearly four decades, but it was only a heartbeat,
resignation, disability, or impeachment conviction away. After the
Twenty-Fifth Amendment’s addition to the Constitution, the vice presidency
has been vacant for only six months.11
The vice presidential replacement process was used efficiently during its
two invocations in the 1970s. Following Vice President Spiro Agnew’s 1973
resignation, it took less than two months for Congress to confirm Gerald Ford
as vice president.12 Ford soon succeeded to the presidency due to Richard
Nixon’s resignation. To fill the resulting vice presidential vacancy, Ford
nominated and Congress confirmed Nelson Rockefeller in a process that took
about four-and-a-half months.13
Through these uses, the Twenty-Fifth Amendment showed its value almost
immediately after its ratification. If Nixon hadn’t been able to name another
Republican to the vice presidency, the next successor under the Presidential
Succession Act would have been the Speaker of the House—who, at the time,
was a Democrat, Carl Albert.14 The guarantee—made possible by the
Twenty-Fifth Amendment—that the White House would stay in the hands of
Nixon’s party could have impacted his decision to resign.
Yet the need for a vice presidential replacement process was not the main
impetus for the Twenty-Fifth Amendment’s development. Rather, it was the
absence of a way to declare the president disabled. Congress’s attention was
focused on the problem by President John F. Kennedy’s assassination—and
the possibility that a small difference in the trajectory of the sniper’s bullet
might have left Kennedy alive but disabled.15
The Constitution’s original succession provision in Article II, Section 1
identified inability as a cause for succession but didn’t define inability or
9. See U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 2.
10. See JOHN D. FEERICK, THE TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT: ITS COMPLETE HISTORY AND
APPLICATIONS 314 (3d ed. 2014).
11. See id.
12. See id. at 268.
13. See id.
14. See id. at 44–45.
15. See, e.g., id. at 55 (quoting Senator Kenneth Keating’s observation that “a matter of
inches spelled the difference between the painless death of John F. Kennedy and the possibility
of his permanent incapacity to exercise the duties of the highest office of the land”).
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provide a way to declare its existence.16 To address that ambiguity, the
Twenty-Fifth Amendment gave the president the power to voluntarily
declare himself unable.17 It also created a process for an involuntary inability
declaration to be used when the president is unable or unwilling to make the
declaration himself.18 That process empowers the vice president acting with
either a majority of the Cabinet or an “other body” created by Congress to
declare the president unable.19
The Twenty-Fifth Amendment’s inability provisions closed a major gap in
the succession system. But another gap remains to this day. There is
currently no process to declare the existence of a dual inability of the
president and vice president. The Twenty-Fifth Amendment deals only with
sole inabilities of the president. If both the president and vice president
became unable, there is no explicit process for letting an official in the
statutory line of succession serve as acting president.
The lack of a way to declare a dual inability would not necessarily prevent
the next person in the line of succession from serving as acting president.
But it could diminish the official’s legitimacy. And, in borderline cases of
inability, it could invite competing claims to the presidency.
The framers of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment were aware of the
dual-inability gap. But they excluded a dual-inability process out of concern
that it would make the amendment too complex to win approval.20
Ideally, Congress will take action to close the dual-inability gap. Reports
issued by Fordham Law School’s Presidential Succession Clinics in 2012
and 2017 argued that Congress has the authority to pass a law creating a
process for declaring a dual inability of the president and the vice president.21
The clinics recommended a process mirroring the Twenty-Fifth
Amendment’s presidential-inability process.22 They called for a law
authorizing the next person in the line of succession after the vice president
to act with a majority of the Cabinet to declare a dual inability.23 The
declaration would allow the next person in the line of succession to serve as
acting president with a clear legal claim to the position.

16. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.
17. See id. amend. XXV, § 3.
18. See id. § 4.
19. Id.
20. See FEERICK, supra note 10, at 74–75.
21. See generally Second Fordham Univ. Sch. of Law Clinic on Presidential Succession,
Report, Fifty Years After the Twenty-Fifth Amendment: Recommendations for Improving the
Presidential Succession System, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 917 (2017); Fordham Univ. Sch. of
Law’s Clinic on Presidential Succession, Report, Ensuring the Stability of Presidential
Succession in the Modern Era, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 1 (2012).
22. See Second Fordham Univ. Sch. of Law Clinic on Presidential Succession, supra note
21, at 964; Fordham Univ. Sch. of Law’s Clinic on Presidential Succession, supra note 21, at
27.
23. See Second Fordham Univ. Sch. of Law Clinic on Presidential Succession, supra note
21, at 960; Fordham Univ. Sch. Of Law’s Clinic on Presidential Succession, supra note 21, at
61.
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Allowing the person next in line to act as president to participate in an
inability determination would very sensibly follow the Twenty-Fifth
Amendment’s model. But this reform might be flawed from its inception if
Congress did not remove legislators from the start of the line of succession.
Empowering the next person in the line to declare a dual inability would
typically mean giving the role to the Speaker of the House. This would be
problematic when the Speaker and president were from different parties. The
possibility of a change in party control of the White House could give the
president and vice president an added incentive to cover up inabilities. And
it could lead the Cabinet—presumably allies of the president—to resist
participating in a dual-inability declaration even when it was necessary.
The bad incentives that might exist if the Twenty-Fifth Amendment’s
inability-declaration model was used for dual-inability scenarios is an
example of the tension between the Amendment and the Presidential
Succession Act of 1947. That tension stems from a more significant
inconsistency: the provisions’ emphasis of different principles for
identifying successors. By authorizing the president to nominate a
replacement vice president, the Twenty-Fifth Amendment embraces the
principle that presidential successors should be allies of the president. In
contrast, the Succession Act allows for political opponents of the president—
lawmakers from the other party—to be successors.
The seventy-fifth anniversary of the Presidential Succession Act is a time
to discuss reforming the statute. The imperfect relationship between the Act
and the Twenty-Fifth Amendment deserves consideration in those
conversations.

